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When there is tax evasion, increased randomness about how much taxable income an auditor 
would assess generally leads to higher reported income and more revenue. When reducing 
randomness is costly, optimality requires some randomness in assessed taxable income. Even if 
reducing randomness is costless, taxpayers may prefer some randomness when the increased 
revenue can be rebated, so that the government’s revenue stays fixed. 
1. Introduction 
When tax reporting is voluntary as in the U.S. income tax system, 
enforcement of the tax code is undertaken primarily through occasional 
audits, with penalties often assessed if the taxpayer is discovered to have 
underreported taxable income. Most studies of optimal tax enforcement focus 
on the frequency of audits and the penalty for evasion. This paper discusses 
another aspect of the tax system that affects underreporting: that taxable 
income as it would be assessed by an auditor is a random variable. 
Taxpayers’ perception that tax assessments are random was documented, for 
example, in the taxpayer survey conducted by Yankelovich, Skelly and 
White, Inc. (1984), in which only 48 percent of taxpayers thought that IRS 
decisions were consistent from one taxpayer to the next (p. 149). 
The randomness has two sources. First, the tax code itself is imprecise. 
Second, for any given tax code, the tax administration agency can alter the 
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extent of randomness by training its auditors more or less uniformly or by 
issuing (or not) detailed regulations. We investigate the welfare and revenue 
consequences of the tax administration’s efforts to reduce randomness, 
assuming the imprecision of the tax code is fixed.’ 
We find that, when reducing randomness is costly,* it is not optimal to 
remove all randomness in tax liability assessments. Also, the enforcement 
agency’s preferred amount of randomness differs according to whether the 
enforcement policy is chosen to maximize revenue or to maximize welfare. 
Section 2 below shows in a simple model that with the probability of audit 
and tines lixed, randomness in assessed taxable income generally enhances 
revenue.’ Section 3 shows that optimality requires some randomness 
whenever reducing randomness is costly.4 A marginal increase in random- 
ness, from an initial point of none, imposes no loss in expected utility and 
does not change the amount of revenue collected. Hence, it is socially 
desirable to save costs by allowing some randomness in tax liability 
assessments, and to rebate the savings to taxpayers. Since this is true for 
every tax rate, it follows that the optimal combination of tax code and 
enforcement policy requires some randomness. 
Section 4 discusses the optimal amount of randomness with two different 
assumptions about the available policy instruments. First, we discuss the fact 
that a fixed amount of revenue can be collected with high frequency of audits 
and little randomness, or with low frequency of audits and high randomness, 
when tax and tine rates are fixed. Since costs can be saved by increasing 
randomness and decreasing the probability of audit, the cost-minimizing 
policy requires as much randomness as possible. With risk-averse taxpayers, 
one therefore might suspect that the cost-minimizing enforcement policy does 
not maximize taxpayer welfare, even if the cost-savings are rebated through 
tax reductions. This depends on how fast the probability of audit can fall as 
randomness increases. In section 4 we also discuss the second-best problem 
that the audit budget is held fixed and additional revenues collected due to 
randomness are rebated to taxpayers (possibly as an increase in public 
‘Randomness could also be reduced by changing the tax law itself. For example, the U.S. 
Treasury Department’s tax reform proposal of November 1984, Tax Reform for Fairness, 
Simplicity, and Economic Growth, stressed the importance of simplifying the tax code. It further 
recognized that simplicity in taxation has several dimensions, among them that ‘under a simple 
system, most responsible taxpayers would be more certain of their tax liabilities’. 
20ne could imagine circumstances in which reducing variability in assessments is not costly, 
and our conclusion does not apply then. For example, it may be that increased clarity of the tax 
code in some cases may reduce the cost of training auditors, and on net save costs. 
3This corroborates the intuition of Roberts (1979), who argued that uncertainty of true tax 
liability ensures conservative decision-making by risk-averse agents, and may therefore be 
preferable to the alternative of having explicit rules for every possible situation. 
4The argument is similar to Baldry’s (1984) argument that ‘complete enforcement of income 
tax laws, designed to reduce income tax evasion to zero, is inefficient when the marginal cost of 
enforcement is positive.’ 
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services).5 Taxpayers may prefer some randomness in tax assessments even 
if reducing randomness is costless. 6 Rebates might smooth consumption 
between states of the world in which the taxpayer is and is not audited, thus 
providing a benefit.’ 
2. Uncertainty and revenue 
We assume that, conditional on audit, the auditor may assess one of two 
incomes, m-d or m+d, as the taxable income, each with probability one- 
half. The parameter m is not true taxable income; rather, it is merely the 
mean of a distribution of possible assessed incomes. There is a maximum 
possible value of d, which is determined by the imprecision of the tax code. 
We assume that the IRS cannot instruct auditors always to ‘err in favor of 
the IRS’. Aside from the fact that the IRS may be concerned with equity, and 
therefore eschew this obvious means to enhance revenue, auditors may differ 
in their understandings of the tax code and have honest disagreements with 
each other, although each thinks he or she is right. The instruction to ‘err in 
favor of the IRS’ would then have no effect. It is costly to resolve these 
disagreements ex ante. This is the cost modeled below. 
In the United States, the taxpayer himself could mitigate the uncertainty 
either by asking the IRS for a binding decision ex ante, or by appealing to 
the Tax Court ex post if the assessment were high. Ex ante decisions have no 
relevance for other taxpayers, and the legal fees are often in the neighbor- 
hood of $10,000 [Lee (1987)]. We assume that, due to costliness, taxpayers 
do not take advantage of this right. Ex post appeals are also rare, since they 
are often more costly than the amount of tax that might be saved. In 
addition, appeal does not eliminate the randomness because, when the tax 
code is truly imprecise, the decision of the Tax Court is unpredictable. 
Appeals would change the probabilities of the high and low assessments, 
since a taxpayer would only appeal if the assessment were high. The 
probability of a high assessment, conditional on appeal, would then be lower 
5We assume that the increased revenue is returned to taxpayers as a lump-sum rebate, rather 
than as a lowered tax rate. This simplitication has been used frequently in the literature. See, for 
example, Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987) and Cowell (1985). There are two differences between 
lowering the tax rate and making lump-sum rebates or increasing public goods. First, the lump- 
sum rebate does not depend on whether the taxpayer is audited or the amount of taxable 
income he is assessed. The benefit of a reduced tax rate depends on whether the taxpayer is 
audited. Second, lump-sum rebates and reduced tax rates have slightly different impacts on the 
taxpayer’s reported income. 
6But we show in our earlier paper [Scotchmer and Slemrod (1987)] that in this regime the 
optimal variance in assessed income is finite. 
‘That expected utility may increase with uncertainty even when there is no cost saving is 
reminiscent of the results of Weiss (1976). Stightz (1982) and Chang and Wildasin (1987), who 
found that when taxation introduces distortions to the labor market, randomness in tax liability 
may improve welfare. The welfare benefit of increased labor supply may outweigh the welfare 
loss of increased uncertainty. This mechanism is absent in our model, 
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than one-half. Since our results do not depend on the particular probabilities 
of each assessment (we consider probabilities of one-half for simplicity), this 
complication would not change the results.8 
Since different auditors would assess different taxable income, honest 
reporting has no meaning, and it is impossible (unless d = 0) for the taxpayer 
to take a riskless position. If he or she reported the maximum income in the 
support of possible assessed incomes, which is m+d in our simple model, he 
or she would avoid fines, but would often find when audited that ‘true 
taxable income’ was overreported and a rebate is forthcoming. 
We assume a linear tax rate t, and that fines are levied at rate f on 
unreported tax liability when an audit reveals that income has been 
underreported. The probability of audit is p. 
If the taxpayer is assessed higher taxable income than reported, he or she 
pays the tax due on assessed income plus a tine on the unreported income. If 
the taxpayer is assessed lower taxable income than reported, he or she is 
rebated the overpaid tax, but is not rebated a ‘reward’ at the fine rate. We 
shall use the notation wNA, wAL, wAH to refer to the net incomes available to 
the taxpayer in the case of no audit, audit with a low assessment, m-d, and 
audit with a high assessment, m+d. Letting y be the taxpayer’s gross income, 
WNA=y--tr, w,,=y-t(m+d)--tf(m+d-r), and wAL= =y-t(m-d) or 
wAL=y- t(m-d) - tf(m-d -r), according to whether reported income I is 
greater or less than m-d. When I cm-d, wAH< w,,< wNA. When r>m-d, 
wAH < WNA < wAL. 
Since the taxpayer’s reported income will typically depend on d as well as 
on the probability of audit and fine rate, the amount of revenue collected will 
also depend on d. We show that when taxpayers have nonincreasing absolute 
risk aversioq9 reported income rises with d, and therefore the amount of 
revenue collected rises with d also. Taxpayers choose reported income 
r(d,p, t) to maximize expected utility, knowing that an audit is possible. The 
optimal report r(d,p, t), which is less than m+d,lO maximizes expected utility, 
8A third possibility is that the taxpayer can seek tax advice from a professional tax preparer 
or advisor to resolve his or her uncertainty. Scotchmer (1988a, 1988b) shows that resolving the 
taxpayer’s uncertainty ex ante will decrease the taxpayer’s expected payments. But in the context 
we discuss here, seeking tax advice will not resolve uncertainty, since the randomness is due to 
auditors’ judgments rather than to the taxpayer’s ignorance. 
9Decreasing absolute risk aversion implies that in the choice between a safe asset and a risky 
asset, the risky asset is a normal good. Therefore decreasing absolute risk aversion is often taken 
as a reasonable assumption about preferences. However, when assessed income is a random 
variable, there is no safe asset. 
lo A report of m+d always dominates a larger report, because we assume fines cannot be 
negative. Reporting income greater than m+d increases taxes when the taxpayer is not audited, 
and has no advantage when the taxpayer is audited. We allow the taxpayer to report negative 
income. As one can see from the first-order conditions (4) and (5) below, the taxpayer will not 
do so if it forces income in the state of the world that he is audited and assessed high to be close 
to zero, provided the marginal utility of income goes to infinity as income goes to zero. 
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EU[r,d,p,t]. Expected utility is a concave function of r, provided U[ .] is 
concave:” 
(1) 
where we must substitute the correct expression for wA,_ according to 
whether r is less than or greater than m-d. 
The expected revenue collected is just the taxpayer’s expected payment: 
R[r(.),d,p,t]=t[l-p(l+f)]r(.)+mpt(l+f), if r(.)<m-d, (2) 
RCr( ), d, P, [I= tC 1 -(p/2)(2 + f)lr( .I + mt(p/2)(2 + f) + (P/2)rfd, 
if r( . ) 2 m -d. (3) 
To show that revenue increases with d, we must characterize the optimal 
report r( .). The optimal report r( .) satisfies (4) or (5), according to whether 
r( .) is smaller or larger than m-d:12 
- ( 1 - P) ww41+ (P/2)f Ww*J + (P/2)f Ww*,l 2 0, 
=O, if r(.)<m-d, 
-(l -p)U’[wNA]+(p/2)fU’[wAn]=0, if m-ddr(.)<m+d, 
(4) 
5 0, if r( ) = m -d, 
2 0, if r( . ) = m + d. (5) 
Proposition 1. Suppose preferences exhibit nonincreasing absolute risk aver- 
sion and ps l/(1 +f).” Then, if d>O and r(.)<m-d or 
“The function EC’(r) (with the parameters d, p and t fixed) is the minimum of the two 
functions 
.f‘(r)=(l-p)U(m-tr)+(p,‘Z)U(m-t(m-d)-tf(m-d-r)) 
and 
+(p,!2)U(m-t(m+d)-t.f(m+d-r)) 
R(r)=(l-p)U(m-tr)+(p/2)U(m~t(m-d))+(p/2)li(m-t(m+d)-tf(m+d-r)). 
That is, EL/(r)-min jf(r),g(r)). A function that is the minimum of two concave functions is 
concave. 
I2 Since expected utility is a concave function of r, the derivative is nonincreasing. It follows 
that the r( ‘) which satisfies (4) and (5) is unique. 
“If d =O (and honestly reporting r=m is therefore equivalent to holding a safe asset), the 
taxpayer will report r<m when p< l/( 1 +S), because the expected return to underreporting 
income is positive. If p= I/( 1 +f), the taxpayer will prefer to report r =m. Since probability of 
audit I/( 1 +f‘) makes underreporting income at d =0 a ‘fair bet’, it is reasonable to restrict p to 
be less than l/(1 +/). 
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m - d < r( . ) 2 m + d,14 revenue increases with d. If d = 0, a marginal increase in 
d does not affect revenue. 
ProoJ: We discuss this separately for the domains on which r( .) <m-d, 
m-d<r(.)<m+d and r(.)=m+d. First, suppose that r(.)<m-d, which 
can only occur if p < l/( 1 + f). Differentiating (4) implicitly, 
(PlW”(l+ fw”Cw*Hl- ~“CWALII 
rd(~)l(l~P~Un~WNAl +(J~jf‘2iluncWAH1 + u,,cwAL,, ifrt.1 <m-d. 
(6) 
Reported income and revenue increase with d as long as the second 
derivative of utility is increasing, as with nonincreasing absolute risk 
aversion. 
Suppose next that m-d < r( .) <m + d. Differentiating (5) implicitly, the 
responsiveness of reported income to randomness is given by the following 
expression: 
(PP)“f( 1 + fwTWAH1 
rd( ) =(l-p)u~W~,j +(P121f2Uf~[WAH~ ’ ifm-d<r(.)<m+d. (7) 
This expression is always positive, and according to (3), revenue rises with 
d.lS 
On an interval of values d for which r( .) =m+d, the derivative of revenue, 
eq. (3), with respect to d is positive. If p < l/( 1 +f), then at d =O, r( .) <m-d 
and an incremental amount of uncertainty will affect neither reported income 
nor revenue, according to eqs. (2) and (6), since wAH= wAL. If p= l/(1 +f), 
then r( .) = m -d in a neighborhood of d =O, according to the following 
lemma, and an increase to d will reduce reported income. But this will not 
affect revenue, since, substituting r(0, p, t) = m -d into revenue function (2) or 
(3), the derivative of revenue is [ 1 - p( 1 + f)]rd( .) = 0. Q.E.D. 
14There may be an interval of values on which r( .) =m-d, athough for d sufficiently large, 
m-d<r( .). At r=m-d, the marginal utility of increasing r jumps down discontinuously by the 
amount (pf‘/2)U’[y- r(m- d)]. This is because, for r <m -d, increasing r reduces the line if m-d 
is assessed, but. when r > m-d, increasing r only increases the rebate in the event that m-d is 
assessed. The optimal report r( .) equals m-d if these marginal utilities are on opposite sides of 
zero. For some values of d, a marginal increase in d will preserve the ‘jump’ at r( ‘) =m-d. if 
p< l/( 1 + ,f), then revenue decreases with d on an interval where r( .) =m -d. 
Beck and Jung (1987) show that, when d is a continuous variable, reported income (and 
therefore revenue) may decrease when the dispersion of d increases. This occurs because one 
marginal benefit of increasing reported income is that it reduces the probability that a fine will 
be assessed. (In our model, this probability is reduced only when r crosses the threshold of 
m-d.) For a taxpayer reporting below m, an increased dispersion of possible assessed incomes 
decreases the likelihood that the reported income will be declared insufficient and a tine assessed, 
so that this component of marginal benefit may be reduced, leading to a lower report. 
151f ps l/(1 +f), then [l -(p/2)(2+f)] is non-negative. 
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Lemma I. If p = l/( 1+ f) and utility exhibits nonincreasing 
aversion, then r(d, p, t) = m - d for d in a neighborhood of d = 0. 
Proof: See the appendix. 
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The intuition behind Proposition 1 is best seen by analogy to a problem of 
portfolio choice. Allingham and Sandmo’s (1972) paper introduced this 
framework for the case that ‘true’ taxable income is defined. In that case, 
understating income is equivalent to purchasing a risky asset which pays off 
in the event the return is unaudited and suffers a loss in the event that an 
audit occurs. When there is randomness in assessed taxable income, the 
taxpayer is in essence forced to hold a risky asset regardless of the reported 
income. The amount of income reported generates another risky asset, whose 
value to the taxpayer depends on the extent of randomness in assessment. In 
other words, one must consider the covariance between the involuntarily 
held random-assessment asset and the asset created by the income report. 
Consider first the case where the optimal report is greater than the low 
assessed income (r > m -d). For given r, an increase in d reduces net income 
in the audited, high assessment state of the world. This increases the state- 
contingent marginal utility of increasing r. An increase in d also increases net 
income in the audited, low assessment state of the world, but income in this 
state is not affected by r, since the taxpayer is simply liable for t(m-d), 
regardless of reported income. Overall, an increase in d increases the 
marginal utility of increasing r in the audited, high-assessment state of the 
world and leaves it unchanged in the other states. Therefore, the optimal 
report increases when d increases. 
When the optimal report is less than the low assessed income, an increase 
in d alters the riskiness of the taxpayer’s portfolio by decreasing income in 
the worst state of the world (audited, high assessment) and increasing income 
by the same amount in the second-best state of the world (audited, low 
assessment). This affects the state-contingent marginal utility of increasing r 
in both audited states of the world. An increase in r increases income in 
these two states identically. As long as the second derivative of utility is 
increasing, as with nonincreasing absolute risk aversion, the increase in the 
marginal utility of r in the high assessment state outweighs the decrease in 
the marginal utility of r. 
In both cases, being forced to hold more of the random-assessment asset 
makes the reported-income asset more attractive. The reported-income asset 
pays off in the audited, high assessment state of the world, in which the 
marginal utility of income increases. 
We cannot conclude from Proposition 1 that the collection agency can 
increase revenue simply by flipping coins, because the randomness cannot 
exceed that permitted by the tax code. Furthermore, a net-revenue- 
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maximizing tax collection agency would always prefer to increase random- 
ness by laying off members of its auditor-training or regulation-writing staff, 
and thereby save costs, rather than by flipping coins. But even so, the 
observation that revenue can be increased costlessly by introducing random- 
ness reinforces one of the main points of this paper: that choosing an 
enforcement policy to maximize revenue does not necessarily serve the public 
interest. The revenue-maximizing enforcement policy is not the welfare- 
maximizing policy. We now consider how much randomness is optimal. 
3. Some randomness is optimal 
We now argue that, when clarifying the tax code is costly, some 
randomness is optimal irrespective of how or why the other tax and 
enforcement parameters are selected. This is because a marginal increase in d 
from d=O saves costs without reducing expected utility or increasing 
revenue. The possibility that d =0 simply means that the tax administration 
agency has suffkient latitude, through uniform training of auditors and 
issuance of rulings, to clarify all ambiguities in the tax code. Presumably, the 
cost involved in eliminating all uncertainty (d =0) would be large, since it 
requires that all ambiguous issues be resolved ex ante, even those that are 
rare. Conversely, the cost saving if some uncertainty is allowed (d > 0) is also 
large. 
The following lemma is required: 
Lemma 2. At d =O, and provided pz l/( 1 + f),16 the derivative of 
EU[r(d,p, t),d,p, t] with respect to d is zero. That is, a marginal increase in 
randomness does not decrease expected utility. 
Proof: Suppose first that p< l/( 1 + f), so that taxpayers report r(0, p, t) <m 
when d =O. The partial derivative with respect to r is zero because of the 
taxpayer’s optimizing choice. Therefore we only need to show that the partial 
with respect to d is zero. The derivative with respect to d is: 
(p/2)t( 1 +f)[V[w,J - U’[w,J], which is zero when wAL = wAH. 
For the case that p= l/( 1 +f), we again need Lemma 1, that r(d, p, t) = 
m-d for small d. Substituting r(d, p, t) = m -d into expected utility, 
it becomes (l-p)U[y-t(m-d)]+(p/2)U[y-t(m-d)]+(p/2)U[y-t(m+d)- 
2tdf]. Using the facts that p = l/( 1 + f) and wA,_ = wAH = wNA, the derivative 
with respect to d at d = 0 is zero. Q.E.D. 
lbFor purposes of Proposition 2 we do not need to consider p> l/( 1 +/), because, if d=O, the 
optimal (d, p, t) would require p 5 l/( 1 + f). Probability p = l/( 1 + f) elicits truthful reporting, and 
a higher probability would be wasteful. 
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Proposition 2. Suppose that the marginal cost of reducing randomness is 
positive, so that increasing randomness saves costs. Then d =O is not optimal. 
Proof: We showed in Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 that at d =O, a costless 
marginal increase in randomness does not change revenue or decrease 
expected utility. That is, the partial derivative of EU[r( .), d, p, t] with respect 
to d is zero. The costs saved by increasing d can be rebated to the taxpayer, 
either as a lump-sum rebate or a reduction in the tax rate, both of which 
increase expected utility. Q.E.D. 
Since this is true for all tax rates t and probabilities of audit p, it implies 
that the optimal combination (t,p, d) requires d >O whenever reducing 
randomness is costly, It is optimal to increase randomness until the marginal 
loss in expected utility is just balanced by the cost-saving. 
4. The optimal amount of uncertainty 
Here we discuss two second-best problems relating to the optimal amount 
of randomness. The first is the problem of enforcement, with a fixed tax code. 
Since revenue typically rises with the probability of audit and typically rises 
with randomness (at least for large enough d), there are many combinations 
of p and d that will collect a fixed amount of revenue. Since raising d and 
reducing p saves cost, the cost-minimizing enforcement policy may require as 
much randomness as possible (that is, the tax authority does nothing to 
reduce the imprecision of the tax code), with small probability of audit.” 
But randomness reduces expected utility by imposing ex ante uncertainty. 
Whether or not high variance in assessed tax liability maximizes taxpayer 
welfare, as well as minimizing the enforcement cost, depends on how fast 
expected utility falls with randomness, relative to the cost savings. Our 
previous paper [Scotchmer and Slemrod (1987)] gives two examples, showing 
that this may go either way. 
We notice that the question of whether high variance is the optimal 
enforcement policy is similar to the question of whether it is optimal to 
increase fines without bound, when the two enforcement parameters are the 
fine rate and audit probability, rather than uncertainty and audit probability, 
as here. In the tradeoff between audit-probability and tines (with no 
randomness) revenue in amount tm can always be collected by choosing 
p(f) = l/( 1 + f), since taxpayers then report income m. (Underreporting 
income is then a ‘fair bet’.) Enforcement costs can always be reduced without 
any loss to taxpayer utility, by choosing ,f larger and p(f) smaller (but never 
“If there is an upper bound on the feasible d because negative income is not allowed, then 
the cost-minimizing amount of uncertainty might be the lowest value d for which r(.)=m-d. 
This is because, when p< I/( I+ f ), revenue decreases with d on the domain where r( .)=m-d. 
Increases in d on that domain save costs, but decrease revenue, necessitating a simultaneous 
increase in the probability of audit, rather than a decrease. 
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quite zero). Thus, there is no conflict between the goals of minimizing 
enforcement cost and maximizing taxpayer utility, provided the tax rate has 
been set such that tm is equal to the revenue requirement. In contrast, 
‘honest reporting’ cannot eliminate variance in income when taxable income 
is random. If the taxpayer reports m, he will have a different net income 
according to whether he is assessed high or low when audited. 
Another second-best problem is whether taxpayers may prefer some 
randomness in assessed taxable income when revenues are returned to 
taxpayers as a lump-sum rebate. In this problem, all other tax and 
enforcement parameters are held fixed, while additional revenue collected 
through randomness is returned to taxpayers, to keep their mean net-of-tax 
income fixed. 
We assume the government keeps the amount of revenue collected when 
d=O. A lump-sum rebate in amount T(d)18 is returned:19 
Proposition 2 showed that when allowing randomness saves costs, tax- 
payers will always prefer some uncertainty to none. The following example 
shows that taxpayers may prefer randomness in tax assessment even when 
there is no cost saving, although this is not generally true. The risk-averse 
taxpayer’s distaste for uncertainty may (or may not) be dominated by the 
fact that increased revenues may smooth consumption over different states of 
the world. 
An increase in randomness, d, increases expected utility in the following 
amount, beginning at a value of d for which r( .) <m-d. (We suppress the 
arguments p and t, since they remain fixed for the remainder of this section.) 
~~~r(.d);T(d)‘dl = [( 1 -p)U’[wNA] +(p/2)[U’[w,,] + U’[w.J]T’(d) 
-(P/W 1+ fxwwA”l- wwAL11~ (9) 
Substituting for U’[w,,] from the first-order condition (4), and for T’(d) 
from (2) yields: 
‘*This means that m is augmented by T(d) in the expressions wNA, VV*,, and wAL. For example, 
wN,,= m + T(d) - tr( .). 
The arguments to the optimal function r( .) must be augmented to include the rebate 7: as 
in r(d, 7: p, t), since the amount of taxable income will typically depend on how rich the taxpayer 
is. The taxpayer does not account for the effect on lump-sum transfers of changing his reported 
income. He takes income m+ T(d) as fixed and is not taxed on his rebate T(d), just as if it were 
a government expenditure on public goods. T(d) is the lump-sum rebate that balances the 
budget on average. If there is a large number of identical taxpayers, then the budget will be 
close to balanced with high probability, and each taxpayer will realize that the effect on T(d) of 
his personal evasion decision is small. 
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d-Wr(. ), T(d), 4 
dd 
= t( 1 + fW2N 1 - P( 1+ f)l( WWA,l + wwALl)rd( .)) 
- WM 1+ f)( ww*Hl- WWALI). (10) 
When rd( .) >O, the first term is positive, while the last term is negative. 
Whether expected utility rises or falls with randomness depends on rd( .), the 
responsiveness of reported income to randomness, as given in eq. (6). No 
simple condition on the utility function and parameters will guarantee that 
utility rises or falls. With constant absolute risk aversion, utility must fall, 
although with decreasing absolute risk aversion, utility may rise or fall. The 
example below, in which utility rises with randomness, has nonincreasing 
absolute risk aversion. 
When d increases, consumption, when not audited, must decrease. Suppose 
wNA increased. That is, suppose m + T(d) -tr( .) rose with d. Then average 
income when audited must fall, since expected tax payments net of transfers 
are held constant. The average consumption when audited is the average of 
M.‘AL and WAH, which is [m + T(d) - tr( )] - t( 1+ f)m + t( 1 + f)r( .). Since the 
report increases with d, average income can fall only if the first term falls, but 
that is a contradiction. 
Thus, when r( .) <m-d, an increase in uncertainty induces a decrease in 
the gap between consumption when the taxpayer is not audited and the 
average consumption when he is audited. The remaining question is whether 
this reduction in the gap can compensate for the increased variance in 
consumption, conditional on audit. The following example shows that it may. 
Example. Suppose preferences are given by 
u(w)= 
log w O<w<(1/0.16)=6.67, 
0.15 (~$5.9808) w > (l/O.1 6) = 6.67. (11) 
This utility function is concave, continuous, and exhibits nonincreasing 
absolute risk aversion. We take m= 10, t =0.4, p =0.15, and f =2. For these 
values, and when d is less than 2, income is in the range of decreasing 
absolute risk aversion when the taxpayer is audited, but is in the linear 
portion of the utility function when no audit occurs. The appendix demon- 
strates that, in this example, expected utility first rises with d, and reaches a 
maximum at d= 1.6. 
5. Conclusion 
We first showed that the optimal enforcement policy requires some 
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randomness in the assessment of taxable income whenever reducing random- 
ncss is costly. This is true whether the saved costs are rebated through taxes, 
or whether a fixed amount of revenue is maintained by reducing the 
probability of audit when randomness increases. 
We also considered the optimal amount of randomness in two second-best 
problems: that of using randomness as an enforcement parameter, when the 
tax code and lines are fixed, and that of using randomness to enhance 
revenue when all other tax and enforcement parameters are fixed. In the 
enforcement problem, it may or may not be optimal to make assessed 
taxable income as random as possible. In the second problem, taxpayers may 
prefer some randomness in tax assessment when they are rebated the 
additional revenue collected, either directly or through public goods that 
they value at least as much as the dollars required to produce the public 
goods. 
Thus, risk aversion does not necessarily imply that uncertainty about the 
tax assessment is suboptimal. 
One implication of this study is that, if the enforcement agency maximizes 
net revenue, it will have a different view of randomness than if it maximizes 
taxpayers’ expected utility. An interpretation of Proposition 1 is that, if the 
enforcement agency maximizes net revenue with the tax code and allowable 
lines fixed, more randomness is often preferred. But more randomness may 
or may not enhance expected utility. Slemrod and Yitzhaki (1987) showed 
that a similar difference arises with respect to the optimal enforcement 
budget with no uncertainty in assessed taxable income. With the tax code 
and allowable lines fixed, an enforcement agency that maximizes net revenue 
will want a larger enforcement budget than does an enforcement agency that 
maximizes expected utility. These divergences suggest caution in interpreting 
enforcement models that assume the agency’s objective is to maximize 
revenue. Benevolent tax collection agencies may not in fact maximize 
revenue, and, indeed, should not. Rather, the tax system and enforcement 
policy should be chosen jointly to maximize social welfare. 
In the simple model we have studied, the only social cost of evasion is the 
uncertainty in consumption that accompanies it. Tax evasion may also affect 
horizontal and vertical equity. Vertical equity cannot be studied in our 
model, since we have assumed all taxpayers have the same income. One may 
consider it horizontally inequitable that some taxpayers get audited and 
lined, while others do not. If these elements are introduced, policies that 
reduce tax evasion are more likely to appear beneficial from a social welfare 
perspective. 
That uncertainty may enhance revenue has recently been corroborated by 
Reinganum and Wilde (1987) for the case that the taxpayer is uncertain of 
enforcement costs and therefore uncertain whether his tax debt will be 
collected, and by Scotchmer (1988a, 1988b) for the case that, although 
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auditors would agree on taxable income, the taxpayer is ignorant of aspects 
of the tax law and must choose whether to resolve uncertainty. In this paper, 
we have shown not only that randomness in assessed taxable income 
generally enhances revenue, but that some randomness is optimal from the 
point of view of social welfare, if randomness is costly to reduce. 
Appendix 
Proof of Lemma 1. At d=O, r(O,p, t) =m, and the value of (4) is zero, since 
wAH = wAL = wNA and p = l/( 1 + f). It follows that the value of (5), which is 
less than the value of (4), is negative. Since wAHg wNA for every d and r, and 
since (5) has negative value when wAH= wNA, it must be true that (5) has 
negative value for wAH and wNA close to m( 1 -t); in particular, when r is close 
to m and d is close to zero. Thus, it cannot occur that m-d < r(d, p, t) -c m +d 
for small d, since that would require (5) to have value greater than or equal 
to zero, a contradiction. 
Hence, for d close to zero, r(d, p, t) grn -d. We now show that r(d, p, t) 
cannot be less than m-d. Since U( .) exhibits nonincreasing absolute risk 
aversion, the third derivative of U( .) is positive, so the marginal utility U’( .) 
is convex. Hence, 
2 -(I -PW’C%J +Pfwuw,4L +(1/W,Ml 
2 -(l -p)U’[WN*] +pf‘U’[w,,] =o. 
The latter equals zero because p = l/( 1 + f). Hence the value of (4) is positive, 
rather than zero, which implies that r(d, p, t) = m-d for d sufficiently close to 
zero. Q.E.D. 
Example. Since p < l/( 1 + f), r( .) <m-d for small d. We will consider such 
values of d. The parameters have been chosen so that wNA is in the domain 
where utility is linear, while wA[, and WA” are in the domain where utility is 
logarithmic. The first-order condition (4) then becomes: 
-(l-p)s-tp 
(P/%f 
m-t(m-d)-tf(m-d-r)+T 
(P/2)f 
+m-t(rn+d)-)-+d-r)+T 
=o. (A.11 
Provided there is a solution to this equation, our hypotheses above are 
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correct and (A. 1) describes the optimal r( 7: d), since there is only one value of 
r that satisfies (4) or (5). We suppress the parameters (p,t) in the expression 
for r( .) because they stay fixed in this discussion. 
Solving (A.l) for r( .) yields: 
(A.2) 
where 
a = 2ts( 1 - p)/p, 
b=2+aw -t(l +f)) 
tf > 
m-t(m-d)(l -tf’) m-t(m+d)(l +f)+?m(l-r(1 +f)) 
c=a-- 
rf rf rf 
=a C- m2(l -t(l+fN2 d2 l+_f = I 2m(l-t(l +fN (tf )= [ 11 f t.f . 
We have disregarded the smaller root of the quadratic equation because 
~“*u is then negative and outside the domain. One can see from this 
expression that 
dr( .) l+f = 
7d-=2ad ~[ 1 f 
[b= -4,x-l - o.5, (A.3) 
which is positive for positive d and equal to zero when d =O. 
Although the representative individual takes the rebate T as fixed, in 
equilibrium it must be that 
T(d) = Ct( 1 -PC 1 + f h-(4 P, t) + m~t( 1+ f )I 
- CH 1 - P( 1 + f ))$A 0) + mPt( 1+ f )I 
= t(l -~(l + fMT(4,4 -@ho)), (A.4) 
where 40, 0) is the report that would be made if d = 0 and T = 0. 
Combining (A.2) and (A.4), we can express the equilibrium level of r( .) as 
a function of d as: 
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r(qd),d)=___f-__ _,y__--__ 
(1 +f)(1 -PI [ 
(1 -P(l +f))r(O o) 
1 f ” 
where 
Then we can show that: 
at-(.) 2ad 1 +f 
dd =l-p 
I 1 f-- [h2-44uc]~0.5>0, ifd>O. 
(A.8 
(A.61 
In our example, m = 10, t = 0.4, p = 0.15, f = 2, and s = 0.15. In this case, (A.5) 
and (A.6) reduce to: 
r(.)=4.28+0.576 (4+4.16d2)0.5, (A.7) 
&( .)/Zd=2.40d(4+4.16d2)-0.5. (A.8) 
From (15) dEU( )/dd becomes: 
-0.09+0.1188d(4+4.16d2))0~’ 
1.47- 1.5d+0.735(4+4.16d?+ 
0.09+0.1188d(4+4.16d2)-0~5 
1.47+ 1.5d+0.735(4+4.16d2)0.5’ 
(A.9) 
At d=O, dEU( .)/dd=O, but dEU( .)/dd is positive for positive d. Expected 
utility is maximized when d = 1.6. 
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